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IV.
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(j) by transfer from the Utah Supreme Court, which had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(k).
V.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The Kurzets adequately identify the issues on appeal and the applicable standards of
review, with one exception: with respect to the standard of review applicable to the trial court's
decision not to impose Rule 11 sanctions against Bailey-Allen, the Kurzets' Brief properly
identifies the "correctness" standard of review for legal conclusions and the "abuse of discretion"
standard for the amount and type of sanction. In addition, the "clearly erroneous" standard
governs the trial court's factual findings underlying its decision regarding sanctions. Barnard v.
Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992).
VI.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTION PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A copy of which is attached hereto in
Addendum 3.
VII.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Facts in the record which clarify, correct or complete the "Relevant Facts" presented by
Kurzet include the following:

1.

When Bailey-Allen entered into its agreement with the Kurzets, the Kurzets' home

had only a foundation and a basement slab, with underslab plumbing and heating. There had
been no back filling and no framing. (R. 331).
2.

The Kurzets were generally happy with the progress of construction of the home

during the time Bailey-Allen was on the job. (R. 608-611).
3.

During the three months of work by Bailey-Allen, Bailey-Allen provided many

general contractor services, including the following:
a.

Generally coordinated work on the job (R. 752-53);

b.

Helped arrange for a framing subcontractor (R. 339-40);

c.

Arranged for and supervised excavation and back filling (R. 339-40);

d.

Assisted in arranging for masonry subcontractors (R. 339-40);

e.

Arranged for preliminary plumbing work (R. 339-40) (R. 116);

f.

Arranged for a concrete cutter (R. 116);

g.

Arranged for a concrete subcontractor (R. 116);

h.

Arranged for a steel contractor (R. 116) (R. 339-40, 427);

i.

Arranged for site organization and site clean up (R. 339-40);

j.

Arranged for inspections by the City (R. 752-53);

k.

Met occasionally with the architect and with the engineer (R. 430-31);

1.

Ordered materials for the project and arranged for a crane to be on site (R.

432-34); and
m.

Placed orders for windows and one order for lumber (R. 443).
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4.

At the time of Bailey-Allen's termination as general contractor, the home was

framed and the roof was partially completed. I

i we work under contact was 10%

complete. (R. 215).
VIII.

The trial court carefully followed this Court's instruction on remand. The trial court
considered the evidence regarding each issue upon which this Court found the original Findings
of Fact i'

;|
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trial court entered detailed, consistent findings on each of those issues.
In its unique position as fact finder', ob;-<r\ ing L;IL - • .*._

J

v*:sonall> and assessing

their credibility, the trial court properly afforded more weight to some evidence than other
evidence. But with respect to each Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law, the court relied upon
substantial e\ iclei ice in tl le i e : ird.
The trial court also properly discharged its duties with respect to the Kurzets' Motions for
Sanctions and for judgment Nunc r:. nine.
IX.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE riUALCULki LUMl'LlbD Willi I H i s i U U R i ' S REMAND
INSTRUCTIONS.
This Court remanded:
For analysis and findings undei the standard articulated in Davies.
The trial court should make detailed, consistent findings on each of
the three required elements and allow recover}7 only if all three are
satisfied.
3

Bailey-Allen v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1994). (R. 812). On remand, the Court
provided detail and consistency on all three of the Davies elements.
1.

The Trial Court's Findings Were Detailed.

The trial court made 23 separate detailed findings regarding: the nature and terms of the
underlying contract (R. 1114); the precise nature of contractual breach as determined by the court
(R. 1115); the exact value of each deficiency found in Bailey-Allen's work (R. 1116); the reasons
for termination of the underlying contract (R. 1118); the number of hours worked per week (R.
1116); the number of visits by Mr. Allen to the project (R. 1116); Mr. Allen's efforts to make
himself available to Kurzet (R. 1116); the "considerable time" invested by Bailey-Allen in
making calls, setting up appointments and contacting other contractors (R. 1117); other "general
contractor services" provided by Bailey-Allen as listed in the court's findings (R. 1117); the stage
of completion before Bailey-Allen's work (R. 1117); the stage of completion after Bailey-Allen's
work (R. 1117); Mr. Kurzet's attention to the project; Mr. Kurzet's satisfaction with the project
(R. 1117); and a step-by-step calculation of the court's monetary award (R. 1120-21). The trial
court fully complied with this Court's request for detail.
2.

The Trial Court Made Detailed Findings As To Each Of The Three Davies
Elements.

The first element which Davies v. Olsen, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah App. 1987) requires in
order to award a quantum meruit judgment is that "the defendant received a benefit." Davies at
269 (R. 812). The trial court's findings carefully identify the benefit received by the Kurzets as
follows:
The court finds that during the time plaintiff was a general
contractor of the project, the residence progressed from a concrete
4

slab to a point where the roof was ready to be completed on the
multi-story residence. Based upon the testimony of defendant's
expert witness, the court finds that ten percent of the construction
project completed by the contract was completed during the time
plaintiff was general contractor. (R. 1117),

general contractor services.
The court concludes that plaintiffs services as a general contractor
conferred a benefit to the defendants." (R 1119)
The court further detailed the general contractor services as follows:
The court finds that during the three-month period that the contract
as in effect, Michael Kent of the plaintiff was on the construct-in
site approximately thirty (30) hours per week. In addition. N t
Richard Allen of the plaintiff visited the construction site
practically every day for some period of time, by his own
testimony.
The court finds that Mr. Allen was also available on his n
phone when not on site and made or received daily calls
concerning the job.
The court finds that Mr. Allen also spent considerable time at his
home in the evening making calls, setting up appointments and
contracting with other contractors in connection with the job.
The court finds that during the three-month period that the contract
was in effect, plaintiff performed general contractor services,
including the hiring of subcontractors, overseeing the work of
subcontractors, getting bids on retaining walls, windows, cabinets
and other items, meeting with people, including building inspectors
and generally coordinating the work on the job. (R 1116, 1117).

The court finds that defendants received a benefit of $5,500
through plaintiffs settlement of the dispute over the amount owed
on the prior lumber order. (R 1118).
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The second Davies requirement is "an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the
benefit." Davies at 269 (R. 812). The trial court's findings are also detailed on this point:
The court finds that defendant Stanley Kurzet was regularly on the
job site, often as much as six (6) hours a day. He personally
observed the progress on the home. As a result, defendants were
aware of the progress of the home while plaintiff was the general
contractor and [were] aware of the benefit defendant received as a
result of plaintiff s services.
The court finds that at no time during the three-month period in
which the contract was in effect did defendants express any
dissatisfaction with the work or progress on the job. On at least
one occasion, Stanley Kurzet expressed to plaintiff that he was
satisfied with the way the work was going. Defendants did not
attempt to stop plaintiff from completing the contract until
defendant Stanley Kurzet terminated the same in connection with
the insurance matter.
The court finds that defendant Kurzet acknowledged at trial that
plaintiff was the general contractor on the job during the time in
which the work was completed which was the subject of plaintiff s
complaint. (R. 1117-18).
With respect to the benefit of $5,500 relating to lumber negotiations, the court found that
"defendants were aware of plaintiff s involvement in such matter and were aware of the $5,500
savings which they thereby received." (R. 1118).
The third Davies requirement is that the circumstances "would make it unjust for the
defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it." Davies at 269 (R. 812). Regarding this
element, the trial court again made specific and separate findings. With respect to the general
contractor services described above, the trial court concluded "that under the circumstances, it
would be unjust for the defendants to retain the benefit received without payment for the same."
(R. 1120). With respect to the benefit to the Kurzets relating to lumber costs, the trial court
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concluded that "defendants were aware of plaintiff s actions with respect thereto and that it would
be unjust to allow defendants to retain such benefits without payment of a reasonable fee to
plaintiff for such benefit." (R. 1122).
3.

The Trial Court's Findings And Conclusions Are Consistent.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law "clarify" rather than "supersede" the original Findings
and Conclusions. I he Kurzets" argument fails because clarification is whai w

,mn requested

and because no inconsistencies remain.
This Court remanded to the trial court because the trial court's prior findings needed
*

*

>*

'
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trial court's findings because "the trial court seemed to agree, at least in theory

' vith the

Kurzets (R. 812) (emphasis added). I he problem was that the facts did i lot "make clear" that a
quasi contract! ia.1 award was appropriate. (R. 812) (emphasis added). This Court also observed
that it was "equally unclear whether the second element of the Davies test was satisfied." (R.

mistaken to insist that the trial court supersede its prior findings. The Appellate Court requested
clarification and the trial court provided it.
Moreover, clarification provides consistency. Because the Amended Findings and
Conclusions clarify prior Findings and Conclusions, the court must interpret the original

that the Amended Findings are inconsistent with the original Findings. For example, the Kurzets
point out that the original Findings stated that Bailey-Allen spent very7 few hours on the job site
7

and did not give the construction project the attention it required. To the extent "very few hours"
needed clarification, the Amended Findings provide it. The 30 hours per week and three months
described in the Amended Findings are "very few" compared to the hours and months anticipated
by the original contract. But they are sufficient to support the trial Court's judgment.
The Kurzets also contend that inconsistency remains within the court's original finding
that Bailey-Allen completed 10% of the construction, with a value of $10,000, "regardless of
whether plaintiff performed its duties under the contract." (R. 216). Again, this is a simple
matter of clarification. The original Finding did not specify whether it meant a complete failure
to perform any duties or whether it meant that Bailey-Allen performed many of it duties and
conferred many benefits "regardless of whether plaintiff performed [all of] its duties under the
contract." The new Amended Findings clarify by concluding that Bailey-Allen's work as a
general contractor conferred benefits to the Kurzets (R. 1119). This is not inconsistent with the
prior Finding that Bailey-Allen failed to perform some of its duties under the contract.
B.

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS EACH OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
The Appellate Court cannot reject the trial court's Amended Findings of Fact unless they

are "clearly erroneous." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 934, 939 (Utah 1994). Where substantial
evidence supports a finding of fact, that finding is not clearly erroneous.
1.

Substantial Evidence Supports Finding No. 14.

The Kurzets contend that Amended Finding of Fact No. 14 is not supported by the
evidence. However, the Kurzets have failed to marshall the evidence. Fact No. 14 states that

8

Michael Kent spent 30 hours per week on the construction site and that Mr. Allen visited the
construction site practically every day. Mr. Kent testified:
Q:

Give me, in terms of hours, per day that you would have
been there.

A:

Average?

Q:

Yes. You would get there at what time?

A:

Most days I would get there around 9:00 leave around 4:00.
Like I say, it was more as things were going on, other
problems, we would be there earlier. Sometimes we were
there — one time it was at 6:30 to meet a pump truck, and
other times we would stay late at night.

Q:

Is it fair to say you were putting in 30 to 40 hour weeks?

A:

More than 30, yes.

Q:

Between 30 and 40 hours a week?

A:

Yeah, we weren't required to spend any time there. It was
as-needed, nothing that says — .

Q:

I understand that. But you were spending 30 to 40 hours a
week?

A:

At least 30 hours, more like 35 to 40.

(R. 482-83).
Of course, the Kurzets site Mr. Kurzet's testimony to the contrary. But this Court need
not weigh the credibility of each witness. There was evidence to support the trial court's finding.
The trial court simply believed the clear testimony of Mr. Kent.
The Kurzets also argued that Finding of Fact No. 14 is unsupported because "there is
apparently no other evidence that Mr. Allen visited the site every day." (Brief of Appellant at 23,
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emphasis added.) But Finding of Fact No. 14 says that Mr. Allen visited the construction site
"practically every day." This is supported by Mr. Allen's testimony that "some days I spent 10
hours on the job, some days I would be there an hour or two." (R. 441). He admitted that he
missed some days. (R. 441). But the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Mr.
Allen visited the construction site "practically every day."
2.

Substantial Evidence Supports Finding No. 15.

The Kurzets next question Finding of Fact No. 15, which states that Mr. Allen was
available on his mobile phone and made or received daily calls concerning the job. The Kurzets
claim the finding is wrong because Mr. Allen said he received only two calls per week from
people "on site." (R. 754). The Kurzets contend that the Findings of Fact are not supported by
the evidence because "two calls per week is not 'daily.'" (Appellants' Brief at 25.) But the
Finding by the court is not that Mr. Allen received calls daily from people on site. In addition to
two calls from the site every week, there were also frequent calls regarding inspections and
subcontractors. All of these calls qualify as "calls concerning the job" as summarized in the
court's Findings.
The record shows that Mr. Allen personally spent many hours on the telephone
coordinating with subcontractors and talking with Mr. Kurzet. In fact, Mr. Kurzet himself
provided the testimony regarding the "daily" conversations discussed above.
Q:

Would you get with Bailey-Allen alone on a day-to-day
basis to discuss the construction progress?

A:

Yes.

(R. 514).
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Mr. Kent explained that many of these conversations were telephone calls between Mr.
Kurzet and Mr. Allen.
(Mr. Kent)
Q:

In addition to that, you spent other time at home at night on
the telephone coordinating?

A:

Yes.

Q:

In an average day, how much time would that take?

A:

Probably an hour or two; however, Richard was always
talking to Stan. I never really talked to him on the phone.
Richard spent a lot of time on the phone.

(R. 489-90).
Within the above portions of testimony, there is ample evidence to support the court's
conclusion that Mr. Allen had daily telephone calls regarding this project, whether receiving or
sending and whether on-site or off-site.
3.

Substantial Evidence Supports Finding No. 16.

The Kurzets next question Amended Finding of Fact No. 16, which states that Mr. Allen
spent "considerable time" at his home in the evening making calls and setting up appointments
related to this contract. The Kurzets' only marshall evidence that Mr. Kent, rather than Mr.
Allen, spent many hours in the evening coordinating subcontractors that could not be reached
during the daytime. The Kurzets argue that Mr. Kent's time does not justify any award based
upon general contractor services because Mr. Kent is not a general contractor. (Appellants' Brief
at 27). Of course, general contractors are not required to make all telephone calls personally in
order to be compensated. As an authorized agent of Mr. Allen, Mr. Kent can coordinate
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schedules with subcontractors and perform, on Mr. Allen's behalf, some of the functions of a
general contractor.
The record also shows that Mr. Allen personally spent "considerable time" on the
telephone coordinating with subcontractors and talking with Mr. Kurzet. As quoted above, Mr.
Kurzet himself testified about "daily" conversations with Mr. Allen. (R. 514). Mr. Kent
explained that many of these conversations were telephone calls between Mr. Kurzet and Mr.
Allen. (R. 489-90).
The Kurzets argue that the evidence shows that Mr. Allen was "seldom there" or "very
seldom there" (Appellants' Brief at 23). Of course, the trial court did not have to believe Mr.
Kurzet. More importantly, regardless of whether Mr. Allen was "there", the evidence indicates
that he helped coordinate and supervise masonry (R. 429-30), framing (R. 431, 432, 433), steel
erection, excavation, compaction, back filling, concrete cutting and plumbing (R. 423, 427).
Accordingly, there is more than enough evidence to support Finding No. 16.
4.

Substantial Evidence Supports Finding No. 17.

The Kurzets next question Amended Fact No. 17, regarding the general scope of general
contractor services provided by Bailey-Allen. The Kurzets admit that Mr. Allen arranged for an
excavator, concrete cutter, a concrete subcontractor, a plumber and a steel contractor. (R. 116,
(Appellants' Brief at 29). The Kurzets also admit that there is evidence to support the finding
that Mr. Allen met with people and generally coordinated the work on the job (Appellants' Brief
at 31, R. 752-53, R. 430-431) and that Mr. Allen placed orders and worked on obtaining bids. (R.
432-34, R. 443, Appellants' Brief at 32). Mr. Allen testified:
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A:

We arranged-along with Stan Kurzet—to get a framing
subcontractor started. We arranged for an supervised
excavation and backfilling. We talked with Stan Kurzet
and arranged, with his approval, the masonry
subcontractors to start on the fire places and masonry.
We had a plumber do some preliminary work. We worked
with the steel erectors, had them complete the erection of
the steel framework. We arranged for site organization, site
cleanup, talked with him on getting an electrical
subcontractor, and had many discussions about that.

Q:

Did you have anything to do with ordering of materials or
supplies during the time you were on the project?

A:

Yes, when we got there, there was a substantial amount of
material on the site that was left there from the previous
builder.
We counted that up for him, and gave him a price we
thought would be the worth for that to settle with the old
contractor.

(R. 339-40).
A:

We did extensive cleanup and keeping the job organized.
We coordinated extensive concrete cutting. We
coordinated with the steel erectors, the erection of the steel
girders.
We did the coordination with the excavators, the bidding
out of the retaining wall work to go in back of the building.
We—I don't know if they mentioned our involvement with
getting the window bids; we did that. We were in the
process of getting cabinet bids and roofing the prices,
anything we were asked to do we were doing it.

Q:

Did you also coordinate with the City to arrange for
necessary inspections on the site?

13

A:

Yes, there were numerous inspections that were scheduled
and coordinated with the masonry and framing subcontractors.

(R. 752-53).
Again, there is more than enough evidence to support the trial court's finding.
5.

Substantial Evidence Supports Finding No. 19.

Finding No. 19 concludes that the Kurzets were aware that they were receiving benefits
from Bailey-Allen. The Kurzets dispute Finding of Fact No. 19, to the extent that it suggests that
the progress on the home was due to Bailey-Allen's efforts. (Appellants' Brief at 34-35). The
portions of evidence, quoted above, more than support a finding that Bailey-Allen's services
contributed to the benefits received by the Kurzets. Whether or not Bailey-Allen's work
contributed to the progress in the construction was a fact issue. Obviously, a homeowner who
stands in the midst of the construction and watches it go from foundation to roofing is aware that
he is receiving a benefit. Moreover, the record includes evidence that the Kurzets had no general
complaint about the general progress of Bailey-Allen's services (R. 466-67).
6.

Substantial Evidence Supports Finding No. 20.

Finally, the Kurzets criticize Finding of Fact No. 20, which states that the Kurzets failed
to express any dissatisfaction with the work or progress on the job. This finding is supported by
the evidence with respect to the general work or progress on the project. Mr. Kent testified:
Q:

Did Mr. Kurzet ever express dissatisfaction generally with
the way things were being handled prior to October 2nd?

A:

Not generally.

Q:

Did he ever express concerns about an item or two that may
be wasn't going the way he wanted it to?

14

A:

Oh, yes.

(R. 466-67). Mr. Kurzet kept a log concerning the progress of the construction. The log
included substantial evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Kurzet was satisfied
with the progress on his home. Mr. Kurzet testified:
Q:

Your entry on August 2nd states: "Good progress on
framing". Is that correct?

A:

Yes.
*** *** ***

Q:

Things were going well, were they not, at that point on the
construction site?

A:

Yes.

Q:

The next entry on August 3rd, you indicate that "things
continue to go well. Plumber showed as promised." Is that
what you say, generally?

A:

It was rather unusual for a plumber to show up as promised.

Q:

The point I am making is, as you indicate, things are
continuing to go well as of August 3rd, are they not?

A:

Yes.

Q:

On August 8th, page number 8, your entry states, "things
going well." Does it not?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Turn to page 11, down at the bottom, August 20, you start
your entry with "the site is substantially cleaned up;" do
you not, Mr. Kurzet?

A:

Yes.

15

Q:

Rather than reading them, let me make three more
comments. If you disagree with me, you can, but in the
interest of time, on August 31 you indicated, "main level
walls going up rapidly and the mason is back making
progress."
Then a few weeks later, on September 20, you said, "walls
going up like fury." . . . Mr. Kurzet, there is a note that you
are going out of town on the 26th of September and you
make an entry that you went to California and "had a warm
feeling that things are going okay." Did you say that on the
26th of September, in your log?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And you were out of town, were you not, until late on
October 1st, according to your entry on September 26; were
you not?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And the next morning, despite your warm, fuzzy feelings,
you get on the site and fire these guys, don't you?

A:

Yes.

(R. 608-611).
The important thing to consider is that the trial court's judgment and award would be
equally sustainable on appeal if the finding of fact had read that the Kurzets failed to express any
dissatisfaction with the work or progress "generally." That statement is supported by the
evidence in the record and, in turn, supports the trial court's judgment.
The Kurzets' appeal is nothing more than a disagreement with the court's conclusions as a
fact finder. The evidence was before the trial court, and it was the trial court's duty to judge the
credibility of that evidence. The trial court was under no duty or obligation to believe any of the
testimony from Mr. Kurzet or any other witness which the trial court found to lack credibility.
16

For each of the trial court's conclusions of fact, there is substantial evidence in the record to
support that conclusion. It matters not whether there would have been other evidence to support
a different conclusion.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED QUANTUM MERUIT
COMPENSATION FOR BENEFITS TO THE KURZETS RESULTING FROM
BAILEY-ALLEN'S LUMBER NEGOTIATIONS.
The trial court properly responded to this Court's instruction to "make certain that any

benefit conferred in negotiating the price of the lumber must be somehow in addition to the
benefits Bailey-Allen conferred by virtue of performing its contractual duty to supervise the
project." (R. 812). The trial court concluded that "negotiation of the disputed lumber bill left
over from prior contractor was not within the scope of the contract." (R. 1121).
The Kurzets illogically suggest that negotiations regarding the disputed prior lumber bill
were anticipated in the original contract because Mr. Allen "included that task in his description
of services that he supposedly provided as a general contractor." (Appellants' Brief at 40-41).
The fact that Mr. Allen said he performed these services and that he did them as a general
contractor, means absolutely nothing about whether he anticipated doing them when he
originally negotiated the contract. The trial court's reasoning makes more sense. A general
contractor would not expect to re-negotiate the price of lumber which has already been ordered
and delivered through the prior general contractor.
The Kurzets do not deny that the record establishes Bailey-Allen's status as a licensed
general contractor and that Bailey-Allen has experience in negotiating lumber prices. The record
clearly suggests that such experience was employed and that a benefit of $5,500 resulted. The
court's decision to award Bailey-Allen fifty percent (50%) of that benefit is not arbitrary. The
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court heard the testimony about Bailey-Allen's work in re-negotiating the lumber price and
concluded that $2,750 was fair.
D.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE KURZETS' MOTION FOR ENTRY
OF JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC
The Kurzets argue that the trial court should have awarded a judgment in their favor

against Bailey-Allen, based upon construction defects, rather than offsetting those values against
Bailey-Allen's judgment. As a practical matter, the Kurzets' argument is meaningless. The
Kurzets did not file a supersedeas bond when they noticed this appeal. Therefore, Bailey-Allen
possesses a collectible judgment against the Kurzets. Bailey-Allen is, therefore, entitled to retain
the amount which the trial court applied as an offset. As stated in the Kurzets' Appellant Brief, a
judgment is final until it is reversed on appeal, modified or set aside by the court that rendered it.
(Appellants' Brief at 43). Based upon the judgment below, Bailey-Allen is entitled to retain the
offset amount.
E.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE KURZETS' MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS.
Before trial, the lower court dismissed Bailey-Allen's mechanic's lien cause of action

because the claimed lien amount was allegedly too high. Upon remand to the district court,
Bailey-Allen moved the district court to reinstate Bailey-Allen's original mechanic's lien claim.
The Kurzets responded by asking for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, based upon its position that the trial court lacked the power to reform a partial
summary judgment from which Bailey-Allen did not appeal. The trial court denied the Kurzets'
Motion for Sanctions. The Kurzets now contend that it was error not to award sanctions. The
Kurzets' argument fails because case law supported Bailey-Allen's position that the trial court
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could reform its previous judgment and case law supported Bailey-Allen's position regarding the
mechanic's Lien.
1.

Case Law Supports Bailev-Allen's Position That the Trial Court Could Reform,
after Appeal, a Judgment Which Had Not Been Raised in the First Appeal.

Contrary to the Kurzets' allegations, Utah law does support the position Bailey-Allen
took when it moved the District Court to reinstate the original mechanic's lien. Under Utah law,
the trial court had the power to reform its pre-appeal partial summary judgment. In Board of
Education of Granite School District v. Cox, 395 P.2d 55 (Utah 1964), the plaintiff sued
defendants Rex and Wilmina Cox for specific performance based upon a real estate agreement
which had only been signed by Rex. The trial court entered a default judgment, requiring
transfer of the property in exchange for $42,000. The court later granted Wilmina's motion to set
aside the default, and denied Rex's similar motion. Rex appealed the trial court's decision not to
set aside the default. No one appealed the amount entered by the trial court. After the Supreme
Court affirmed, the plaintiff sought an order directing Rex to transfer his interest in the property
for $21,000. Rex contended that the affirmed judgment was the law of the case, and could not be
reformed by the trial judge. The trial judge reformed its earlier judgment, and ordered Rex to
convey his interest for $21,000. On the second appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed
The question now, however, is whether the lower court had the
power to reform the judgment against Rex after the same had been
affirmed by this court. Under the particular facts of this case, we
are of the opinion that it did.
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in
furtherance of justice relieve a party .. . from a final judgment...
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Applying the foregoing Rule to the case at hand, the lower court
was right in relieving plaintiff from the $42,000 judgment. . .
Cox at 56.
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the trial court's power to reform its judgment. It did
so in spite of the dissent's concern that the original judgment has persisted without complaint or
motion by the plaintiff before, during, or for a considerable time after the Supreme Court's
decision. Id
Other authorities also support the position taken by Bailey-Allen before the trial court.
Wright and Miller quote the "classic statement" of Justice Holmes that "the law of the case
doctrine 'merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been
decided, not a limit to their power.'" Wright and Miller Federal Practice and Procedure: § 4478.
(emphasis added.)
Moore's Federal Practice Second Edition, paragraph 0.404[10] provides
In the case of a remand for further proceedings, the mandate
constitutes the law of the case only on such issues of law as were
actually considered and decided by the appellate court, or
necessarily to be inferred from the disposition on appeal.
In the case of bar, this Court in the original appeal did not address the merits of the partial
summary judgment with respect to the mechanic's lien. Accordingly, it remained within the trial
court's power to reform its own judgment. See also, Hutchins v. State, 603 P.2d 995 (Idaho
1979).
Bailey-Allen voluntarily withdrew its motion to reinstate the mechanic's lien. But
Bailey-Allen could have pursued its motion in good faith and on the basis of existing law.
Therefore, Bailey-Allen did not violate Rule 11.
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2.

Case Law Also Supported Bailev-Allen's Position Regarding The Mechanic's
Lien.

Although this Court specifically addressed the issue of whether the prevailing party on a
mechanic's lien must be awarded attorney's fees (R. 814), this Court did not address the issue of
whether an overstatement of the amount due on a mechanic's lien invalidates the lien. The law
supported Bailey-Allen's position that the trial court should reinstate the mechanic's lien in light
of the trial court's decision to enter judgment in favor of Bailey-Allen:
Where the amount due under an entire contract is claimed in a lien
notice, and the claim of full performance is erroneous, it will not,
in the absence of a willful or intentional falsification, defeat the
lien or the amount found actually due.
53 Amjur 2.d Mechanic's Liens § 234, 755-756.
This Court has sustained the validity of the mechanic's lien that contained an erroneous
legal description in For-Shor Company v. Early, 828 P.2d 1080 (Utah App. 1992) where it
caused no prejudice to the parties involved. Utah courts have consistently held that mechanic's
lien statutes were enacted to protect those who enhanced the value of property by supplying labor
or materials thereto, and should be broadly construed to effectuate that purpose. Richards v.
Security Pacific National Bank, 849 P.2d 606 (Utah App. 1993). See also, Graff v. Boise
Cascade Corp., 660 P.2d 721, 722 (Utah 1983) (holding that "the doctrine of substantial
compliance has validity and it has application in an appropriate case [relating to mechanic's
liens]). See, R. 973-76.
In light of the substantial authorities which support the trial court's power to reform its
earlier judgment, the trial court properly refused to impose Rule 11 sanctions against BaileyAllen.
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Contending that the trial court erred, the Kurzets imply far too much into the trial court's
comments from the bench. Although the trial court agreed that Bailey-Allen should have
appealed the mechanic's lien issue, rather than move for reinstatement of the lien after appeal, the
trial court did not find that counsel acted in a manner inconsistent with "the best of his
knowledge, information and belief or that counsel failed to make a reasonable inquiry or that
there was no good-faith argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law. To the
contrary, the reasonable inference from the trial court's decision is a factual determination that
Bailey-Allen's counsel acted in a manner consistent with the best of his knowledge, information
and belief, after reasonable inquiry. The trial court's factual determination is reviewed on appeal
under the "clearly erroneous standard." Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992).
If the trial court's comments from the bench amount to a conclusion that counsel violated
Rule 11, then the trial court erred in so finding, for the reasons stated above. But, even then, the
trial court's decision not to award money was within its discretion. As this court has declared,
and as the Kurzets concede, "The Rule gives the trial court substantial latitude to tailor the
sanctions to fit the particular facts of each case." (Appellants' Brief at 48) citing Taylor v. Estate
of Taylor, 110 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1989). Rule 11 does not require those sanctions to include
attorney's fees. Rather, Rule 11 provides that the sanctions "may" include attorney's fees. The
trial court may fashion its own remedy, which is reviewed on an "abuse of discretion" standard.
Id
The trial court used the latitude afforded in the Rule to consider the conduct of counsel on
both sides. Over counsel's objections, the Kurzets brought their Motion for Attorney's Fees
before Judge Iwasaki, who had not been involved and was not familiar with the facts underlying
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the Motion for Attorney's Fees. The trial court deemed the Kurzets' maneuver to be improper.
("I think it was improper for him [Kurzets' counsel] to bring it before [Judge Iwasaki]). (R.
1061). Rather than complicate matters, the trial court exercised its substantial discretion and
latitude by denying each side's allegation of improper conduct by the other.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Bailey-Allen respectfully requests that this Court affirm.
DATED this ' b

day of January, 1997.
ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN &
CHRISTENSEN

By:

J,
Bruce J. Nelson, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
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BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
Stanley Kurzet, Anne Kurzet, ^and the Kurzet Family Trust
appeal from a district court order awarding Bailey-Allen Company,
Inc., damages, prejudgment interest, and postjudgment interest
under a construction contract and denying the Kurzets' request
for attorney fees on their successful summary judgment motion.
We reverse and remand.
FACTS
In July 1990, Stanley Kurzet and Bailey-Allen Company, Inc.
entered into a contract for the construction of the Kurzets'
home. The agreement, which Mr. Kurzet drafted, provides in
relevant portion:

uao9

This Agreement covers all of the
understandings existing between BAILEY-ALLEN
(Contractor) and STANLEY KURZET (Owner) for
the construction of a residence on LOT #4 of
the EVERGREEN development at DEER VALLEY,
PARK CITY, UTAH.
The Contractor is retained by Owner on a
cost plus fixed fee basis. Costs shall be
billed monthly and payment shall be made
within ten days of receipt of billing. The
fee fixed for this contract is set at
$100,000 for the residence as depicted in the
drawings plus a maximum of $50,000 in
directed additional work, if any. Any
directed additional work in excess of an
aggregate cost of $50,000 will result in
additional fees based on 7% of the cost of
such additional work.

Both Contractor and Owner stipulate that
this contract cannot be changed except and
unless in writing, bearing the date and
signatures of both parties.

The Owner's review authority
notwithstanding, the Contractor is fully
responsible to Owner for the performance of
subcontractors. Accordingly, costs
occasioned by the failure of a subcontractor
to perform shall not be assessable to Owner.
The Contractor shall carry insurance
specifically providing for saving Owner
harmless from any action arising due to the
injury of a worker even if an employ[ee] of a
subcontractor or supplier who is not properly
or adequately insured. Contractor shall,
within 10 days of the date of this agreement
furnish a Certificate of Insurance prepared
by the Carrier or its Authorized Agent. The
Certificate shall specifically state the
purpose and limits of the policy and these
shall show that the work to be performed
under this contract is covered.
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Contractor takes note that Owner is
concerned about the quality of workmanship
and materials and that this concern stems
from prior experience with a local contractor
and ownership of several condominiums at the
Pinnacle development. Owner will not make
unreasonable demands, however, slovenly
workmanship and/or substandard materials will
neither be accepted [n]or paid for by Owner.
Owner considers that the fees he pays to
Contractor are specifically for his expertise
in selecting and supervising workers so as to
avoid unacceptable and substandard
workmanship and/or the use of substandard
quality materials.
The agreement is silent regarding remedies in the event of a
breach by either party.
Ten days after the contract was signed, Mr. Kurzet requested
the required certificate of insurance, but never received it.
Bailey-Allen later admitted that its policy had expired nearly
two years earlier. In October 1990, Mr. Kurzet terminated
Bailey-Allen's services, based on its failure to provide proof of
insurance and Mr. Kurzet's dissatisfaction with Bailey-Allen's
attention to the project. At the time of the termination, the
work under the contract was approximately 10% complete, with the
house framed and the roof partially finished.
Bailey-Allen filed a complaint against the Kurzets in
December 1990, alleging breach of contract, mechanics' lien,
unjust enrichment, and failure to obtain a construction bond.
The trial court subsequently granted the Kurzets' motion for
partial summary judgment on the latter three causes of action,
reserving the breach of contract c^aim for trial to the bench.
At the trial on the breach of contract claim, the court
reinstated sua sponte the unjust enrichment claim and granted a
continuance for the parties to present their evidence thereupon.
After hearing the evidence, the court determined "that the
subject contract was ambiguous and incomplete as drafted and that
the Court has a responsibility to add to it." The court further
concluded that Bailey-Allen's failure to provide evidence of
insurance and its lack of supervision of the project were
material breaches of the contract that justified the termination.
The court determined the Kurzets had not breached the contract.
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The trial court then concluded that Bailey-Allen was
entitled to recover under its unjust enrichment theory and went
on to consider the amount of damages due, concluding that "the
most logical basis [was] the percentage of defendants' residence
that was completed during the period plaintiff was on the job,"
Accordingly, the court awarded Bailey-Allen $15,500 "in quantum
meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between plaintiff
and defendants, $10,000 representing 1/10 of the contract price
for services in completing 1/10 of the construction, and $5,500
for services involving negotiations for the purchase of lumber."
Bailey-Allen was held liable to the Kurzets for $1800 in costs
for repairing Bailey-Allen's faulty construction of a retaining
wall, for $2000 for repairing its faulty construction of concrete
steps, and for $559 in costs for unnecessary materials.
The court entered judgment for Bailey-Allen in the amount of
$11,141, representing its damages offset by the amounts owed to
the Kurzets. The court awarded Bailey-Allen prejudgment interest
and postjudgment interest from and after April 17, 1992, the date
the trial court granted Bailey-Allen's motion to compel findings
of fact and conclusions of law. The court dismissed the Kurzets'
counterclaims and denied their claim for attorney fees and costs
associated with their successful motion for partial summary
judgment on the mechanics' lien and construction bond claims.
The Kurzets appeal, claiming the trial court erred in: (1)
awarding Bailey-Allen damages under the contract or in quantum
meruit; (2) awarding prejudgment interest; (3) awarding
postjudgment interest from the date it granted Bailey-Allen's
motion to compel findings of facts and conclusions of law, rather
than from the date the judgment was entered; and (4) denying
their claim for attorney fees and costs on their successful
partial summary judgment motion under the mechanics' lien and
construction bond statutes.
I.

DAMAGE AWARD

The trial court awarded Bailey-Allen $15,500 in damages "in
quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between
the parties."1 Whether the court's theory of recovery was proper
raises a question of law, which this court reviews for
correctness. Van Dvke v. Chappell. 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah
1. Bailey-Allen argues that the award of $10,000 was "clearly
awarded pursuant to the construction contract [and not] under an
^unjust enrichment' theory." However, the basis of the award is
not as clear as Bailey-Allen suggests, particularly in light of
the wording of the judgment.
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1991). We are also mindful that we may affirm a trial court's
decision on any proper ground. Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte
Vista Ranch, Inc.. 758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah App.), cert, denied.
769 P.2d 819 (Utah 1988); accord Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc..
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). Therefore, we can affirm the
award if we find any proper basis to support it.
A.

Recovery Under the Contract

We first look at the written contract to determine whether
its terms justify the damage award. In evaluating the contract,
this court must first ascertain whether the contract was
integrated and second whether it was ambiguous. Ron Case Roofing
& Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomcruist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah
1989). Neither party argued that the contract was not
integrated, and it expressly states that it was the entire
understanding of the parties and could not be changed except in
writing. Regarding ambiguity, however, the contract provided no
guidance relevant to the proper remedy for breach. As such, the
contract was ambiguous or, more accurately, silent as to the
intent of the parties regarding remedies in case of breach.
Furthermore, no extrinsic evidence shed light on what remedies
the parties intended in the event of a breach.
In the absence of any express contract provision or
extrinsic evidence of intent, we look to a rule set forth in an
early supreme court case for guidance in our analysis: "In an
action upon the contract [the contractor] cannot recover unless
and until he [or she] shows that he [or she] has, substantially
at least, complied with its provisions." Rvan v. Curlew
Irrigation & Reservoir Co., 36 Utah 382, 391, 104 P^ 218, 221
(1909) (emphasis added); see also Reliance Ins. v. Utah Dept. of
Transp., 858 P.2d 1363, 1370 (Utah 1993) (discussing doctrine of
substantial completion, but holding it inapplicable on facts of
case). Professor Corbin states this rule as follows: lf[W]hen a
contract has been made for an agreed exchange of two
performances, one of which is to be^-rendered first, the rendition
of this one substantially in full is a constructive condition
precedent to the duty of the other party to render his [or her]
part of the exchange." 3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts
§ 700, at 309 (1960).
However, "[i]f the defective performance, though less than
* substantial' has conferred benefits on the defendant in excess
of his [or her] injury, he [or she] may be under a quasicontractual duty to pay that excess." Id. § 700, at 310. Thus,
[a] contractor whose breach is such that he
[or she] has rendered less than "substantial
performance" has no right to the contract
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price; he [or she] is said to have no remedy
"on the contract" . . • . The contractor's
right is a right to reasonable compensation
for value received by the defendant over and
above the injury suffered by the contractor's
breach.
Id. § 710, at 342.
Applying this principle, we conclude neither the court's
findings nor the underlying evidence establish that Bailey-Allen
substantially performed under the contract. The court found only
that what work was accomplished had come about regardless of
whether Bailev-Allen performed. Furthermore, the court
acknowledged that Bailey-Allen was "not performing" certain
aspects of the contract, in addition to failing to obtain
insurance. Even if we attribute to Bailey-Allen the 10% of the
work completed during its three-month tenure, it still does not
constitute substantial performance. Because Bailey-Allen failed
to substantially perform as required by the contract, it cannot
recover under the contract.
B.

Recovery in Quantum Meruit

The Kurzets argue that the existence of a written contract
bars an action in quantum meruit. They are correct that recovery
in quantum meruit typically presupposes that no enforceable
written or oral contract exists. Karaoanos v. Boardwalk Fries,
Inc., 837 P.2d 576, 578 (Utah App.), cert, denied/ 843 P.2d 1042
(Utah 1992); accord Davies v. Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah App.
1987). However, as explained above, there is no enforceable
contract between Bailey-Allen and the Kurzets. Thus, recovery
under quantum meruit may be appropriate.
As discussed earlier, a non-breaching party is discharged
from its contract duties but may h^ye a quasi-contractual duty to
pay the value of the benefit conferred in excess of the damage
caused by the contractor's breach. Corbin §§ 700, at 309-10,
707, at 329. The Utah Supreme Court employed an analogous
approach in Lowe v. Rosenlof, 12 Utah 2d 190, 364 P.2d 418
(19 61), suggesting that recovery in quantum meruit is appropriate
to compensate a breaching contractor for pre-breach work
performed. The court stated that while a breaching contractor
"is not entitled to the benefits of the contract, he [or she] is,
nevertheless, entitled to payment on a quantum meruit basis for
the work which he [or she] did perform." Id., 12 Utah 2d at 19495, 364 P.2d at 421; see also Backus v. Apishapa Land & Cattle
Co., 615 P.2d 42, 44 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980); Eckes v. Luce, 173 P.
219, 220 (Okla. 1918).
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Quantum meruit has two branches, both rooted in justice.
Davies. 746 P.2d at 269; accord Scheller v. Dixie Six Corp.. 753
P.2d 971, 975 (Utah App. 1988). The branch applicable to this
case is a contract implied in law, also known as quasi-contract
or unjust enrichment, which is a legal action in restitution.
Davies. 746 P.2d at 269. To prove a contract implied in law or
unjust enrichment, the following must be shown: •• (1) the
defendant received a benefit; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by
the defendant of the benefit; (3) under circumstances that would
make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without
paying for it." id.; accord Backus, 615 P.2d at 44. The benefit
conferred on the defendant, and not the plaintiff's detriment or
the reasonable value of its services, is the measure of recovery.
Davies. 746 P.2d at 269; accord Scheller. 753 P.2d at 975.
The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law do
not specifically address the three requirements for recovery
under unjust enrichment, nor do the undisputed underlying facts
make clear that a quasi-contract award is appropriate. Instead
the court's findings are internally inconsistent. For example,
the trial court concluded that Bailey-Allen conferred a $10,000
benefit "regardless of whether plaintiff performed its duties
under the contract." The Kurzets argue persuasively that BaileyAllen does not satisfy the first element of the Davies test
because Bailey-Allen conferred no benefit upon them. The trial
court seemed to agree, at least in theory, in finding that the
10% of the work completed during Bailey-Allen's tenure was not
necessarily due to its presence or performance.
It is equally unclear whether the second element of the
Davies test was satisfied. Mr. Kurzet's testimony suggests he
failed to realize any benefit conferred directly by Bailey-Allen.
In fact, the core of the Kurzets' defense is that Bailey-Allen
failed to perform any of the material terms of the contract and
that any portion of the project completed was accomplished by
other parties. Furthermore, the trial court found that BaileyAllen did not give the project the attention Mr. Kurzet demanded.
Finally, under the third element, the trial court did not find
explicitly that it would be unjust to allow the Kurzets to
retain, without payment, the construction completed before
Bailey-Allen was terminated.
We are simply unable to determine whether the trial court's
award of $10,000 "in quantum meruit/unjust enrichment" was
predicated on the proper legal standard. We therefore reverse
the award and remand for analysis and findings under the standard
articulated in Davies. The trial court should make detailed,
consistent findings on each of the three required elements and
allow recovery only if all three are satisfied.
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C.

Measure of Damages

If the trial court determines on remand that an award is
warranted, we offer the following guidance for assessing the
measure of damages. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
suggests a measure of damages referred to as "restitution in
favor of party in breach." Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 374 (1981) . Section 374 states that the breaching party is
liable for the loss caused by the breach, but may recover the
benefit conferred if it exceeds that loss. Id. The party
seeking restitution must prove the measure of that benefit. Id.
Therefore, if on remand the trial court determines that
recovery under quantum meruit is appropriate, it must make
findings on the damages caused by Bailey-Allen's breach. The
court should also make particularized findings on any benefit
conferred on the Kurzets by Bailey-Allen, including its
supervision as the general contractor and its involvement in
negotiating the purchase price of the lumber at issue. We note
that the court should make certain that any benefit conferred in
negotiating the price of the lumber must be somehow in addition
to the benefits Bailey-Allen conferred by virtue of performing
its contractual duty to supervise the project. Bailey-Allen
should ultimately recover only the benefit conferred in excess of
the damage it caused. We also note that the percentage of the
work completed, if it resulted from Bailey-Alleys efforts, is
not an unreasonable measure of the benefit conferred. See
Darrell J. Didericksen & Sons, Inc. v. Magna Water & Sewer, 613
P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1980) (noting trial court may determine
recovery "on the basis of the contract price, or on the
reasonable value, of the portion of the project already completed
and not paid for"); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
374 (1981) (deeming contract price inconclusive evidence of
benefit conferred and stating "in no case will the party in
breach be allowed to recover more than a ratable portion of the
total contract price where such a portion can be determined").
II.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST

The Kurzets next claim that the trial court improperly
awarded Bailey-Allen prejudgment interest. Because we vacate the
judgment, we deal with this issue only for the benefit of the
trial court if it concludes on remand that a judgment under
quantum meruit is proper.
A trial court's decision on "entitlement to prejudgment
interest presents a question of law which we review for
correctness." Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.. 848 P.2d
171, 177 (Utah App. 1993). The Utah Supreme Court recently

930178-CA

8

reiterated the rule that prejudgment interest is properly awarded
when "the loss had been fixed as of a definite time and the
amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy
in accordance with well-established rules of damages." Bellon v.
Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991). The court also noted
***+^t prejudgment interest is typically not allowed in cases of
editable relief that ••*address themselves to the conscience and
discretion of the trial court.'" Xsi. (quoting Fullmer v. Blood.
546 P.za 606, 610 (Utah 1976)).
This court has previously rejected a claim for prejudgment
interest on an unjust enrichment award. Shoreline Dev.. Inc. v.
Utah County. 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. 1992). We noted that
"the lack of mathematical certainty generally prevents an award
of prejudgment interest in equity claims." Id. We conclude that
any damages in this case cannot be fixed at a particular time and
with accuracy. Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 1225
(Utah App. 1990). Therefore, even if recovery in quantum meruit
is awarded on remand, no prejudgment interest should be awarded.
III.

POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST2

The Kurzets also appeal the award of postjudgment interest
at 12% per annum from and after April 17, 1992, the date upon
which the trial court granted Bailey-Allen's motion to compel
findings, conclusions, and judgment.3 They claim that
postjudgment interest, if appropriate at all, should accrue only
as of the date a judgment is entered. We review the award of
postjudgment interest, a question of law, under the .correction of
error standard. Cf. Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.. 848
P.2d 171, 177 (Utah App. 1993) (applying same standard of review
to prejudgment interest).

2. If the trial court does not award damages on remand, then
there will be no basis for post-judgment interest. We therefore
offer the following guidance only in the event that damages are
awarded.
3. Apparently the delay in filing the findings, conclusions, and
judgment occurred because the Kurzets obtained new counsel. As
soon as the substitution of counsel took place, the documents
were filed. Bailey-Allen argues that it was appropriate for the
trial court to "penalize" the Kurzets for this delay. The
Kurzets counter that Bailey-Allen could have sought sanctions for
the delay and that the trial court should not have penalized them
in this fashion for delaying the entry of the judgment.
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Our decision in Mason v. Western Mortgage. 754 P.2d 984
(Utah App. 1988), disposes of this issue. In Mason, this court
held that postjudgment interest dates from the entry of a new
judgment upon remand. Id. at 987. Moreover, we cited with
approval a California case holding that , n [a] judgment bears
legal interest from the date of its entry in the trial cnnrt, MI
Id. at 986 (quoting Stockton Theatres. Inc. v. Palermo. ^c*0 P. 2d
76, 78 (Cal. 1961)).
Mason dictates that any postjudgment interest awarded in
this case should run only from the date of the new judgment on
remand. Id. at 987. We therefore reverse th* award of
postjudgment interest from April 17, 1992 and remand for the
entry of postjudgment interest, if damages are awarded, only from
the date the new judgment is entered.4
IV.

ATTORNEY FEES

Finally, the Kurzets challenge the trial court's denial of
their request for attorney fees and costs attributable to their
successful motion for partial summary judgment. On September 24,
1991, the trial court granted the Kurzets' motion for partial
summary judgment on the mechanics' lien and construction bond
causes of action. At that time, the court "reserved for future
determination" the request for attorney fees and costs. Although
the Kurzets subsequently filed an Affidavit of Attorney Fees and
Costs and requested such fees on several occasions, the trial
court never determined the amount of fees and ultimately denied
without explanation the request for attorney fees and costs
attributable to the successful motion for partial summary
judgment.
In most cases, attorney fees are appropriately awarded only
if authorized by statute or contract. Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 13JB8) . The Mechanics' Lien
statute provides: "In any action brought to enforce any lien
4. To avoid confusion on remand, we wish to make clear that any
post-judgment interest should run from the date that the new
judgment is entered, rather than orally rendered. See Utah R.
App. P. 32; Mason, 754 P.2d at 987; see also National Steel
Const. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 543 P.2d 642, 644-45
(Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (concluding entry of judgment and not oral
ruling liquidates damages because oral ruling subject to change
before entry); Pure Gas & Chem. Co. v. Cook, 526 P.2d 986, 993
(Wyo. 1974) (concluding verdict is not final liquidation of sum
due until judgment entered and awarding post-judgment interest
from date of entry).
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under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to
recover a reasonable attorneys/ fee, to be fixed by the court,
which shall be taxed as costs in the action." Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-1-18 (1988) (emphasis added). Bailey-Allen concedes that
section 38-1-18 applies and apparently does not dispute that this
is an action "to enforce any lien." Id. The issuef then, is
whether attorney fees must be awarded under the statutory scheme.
In Rotta v. Hawk. 756 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1988), this court
observed that a lien foreclosure action satisfied the
requirements of section 38-1-18. !£. at 716. Furthermore, the
supreme court has previously ruled that the benefit of attorney
fees under the statute is conferred upon "the successful party,"
which may include the party who defended against the lien.
Palombi v. D & C Builders. 22 Utah 2d 297, 300-01, 452 P.2d 325,
327-28 (1969) . Therefore the Kurzets, as the successful party,
were entitled to attorney fees.
We thus conclude that the trial court erred in denying the
Kurzets' request for attorney fees under the Mechanics' Lien
statute, and we remand for a determination of the amount of
reasonable attorney fees. For guidance in calculating that
amount, we direct the trial court to Dixie State Bank. 764 P.2d
at 989-90 (establishing "practical guidelines" for evaluating
evidence of reasonable attorney fees).
Attorney fees under the Bond Statute may also be warranted.
The Bond Statute states: "In an action for failure to obtain a
bond, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party." Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(3) (1992) (emphasis
added). Bailey-Allen is apparently correct, then, that section
14-2-2(3) endows the trial court with discretion in awarding
attorney fees. We must therefore determine whether the trial
court's denial of those fees constituted an abuse of discretion.
Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross. 849 P.2d 1187, 1194
(Utah App.), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993) (awarding
attorney fees under contract) . Hoover, in order for this court
to conduct a meaningful review of that determination, we must
rely on adequate findings of fact, Brown v. Richards. 840 P.2d
143, 155-56 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah
1993) , which are absent in this case.
Consequently, the trial court's failure to set forth its
basis for denying the requested attorney fees was an abuse of
discretion, and we remand for the entry of findings supporting
the decision to award or deny attorney fees under the Bond
statute. When determining whether attorney fees should be
awarded under the Bond Statute, the trial court should consider
precedent treating the Bond Statute as auxiliary to the
Mechanics' Lien Statute and as sharing with it a common purpose.
See King Bros.. Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co.. 13 Utah 2d 339, 341,
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374 P.2d 254, 255-56 (1962); Rio Grande Lumber v. Darke, 50 Utah
114, 124, 167 P. 241, 245 (1917). Those cases suggest that it is
generally appropriate to award reasonable attorney fees under the
Bond Statute when fees are awarded under the Mechanics' Lien
Statute.
CONCLUSION
Bailey-Allen was not entitled to recover damages under the
contract. However, it may be entitled to recover in quantum
meruit. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the entry of
findings consistent with this opinion and, if those findings
support an award in quantum meruit, for the entry of a judgment.
We reverse the award of prejudgment interest, and we direct the
trial court to award postjudgment interest, if a judgment is
awarded, only from the date the new judgment on remand is
entered. Finally, we reverse and remand for the entry of
attorney fees under the Mechanics' Lien Statute and for
consideration of whether they should be awarded under the Bond
Statute.

Vnadith M. B i l l i n g s , 0
Presiding Judge
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

Cierk 01 Summit Geunty
By.

Deputy Ctef*

&

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff.
vs.

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

STANLEY M. KURZET, an individual;
STANLEY M. KURZET and ANNE L.
KURZET, as Trustees for the Kurzet
Family Trust; THE KURZET FAMILY
TRUST: and JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH

Civil No. 10870

[0.

Defendant.

This matter was tried to the Court on December 18 and 19, 1991 and January 30,
1992.

Having considered the evidence, testimony and exhibits produced at trial and the

arguments of counsel, this Court previously entered its original Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment on October 6, 1992. Defendants subsequently appealed the Court's
Findings. Conclusions and Judgment.
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On May 24, 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision reversing this
Court's prior decision and remanding the matter to this Court for additional consideration.
Subsequently on January 23, 1995, Judge Glenn Iwasaki of this Court entered
Judgment in favor of Defendants in the amount of $1,937.50 for attorneys fees in connection
with previously dismissed mechanic's lien and bonding statute causes of action.
Pursuant to motion of the Plaintiff that this Court enter Amended Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Amended Judgment pursuant to the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals, this Court has carefully reviewed the pleadings and documents on file herein,
including the transcript of proceedings at trial. The Court has further reconsidered its original
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment pursuant to the direction of the Utah Court of Appeals
decision dated May 24, 1994.
Further, on November 21, 1995, this Court also heard and considered oral argument by
counsel for the parties on the issues relating to Plaintiffs motion to reconsider the matter.
The Court acknowledges that through mis-communication between itself and counsel for the
parties, the original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were inadequate and the Court
desires to clarify its findings, conclusions and decision based upon the evidence. As a result,
the following Amended Findings of Fact and Amended Conclusions of Law 3upcr3cpe the
original Findings and Conclusions entered by the Court prior to Defendants' appeal.
Accordingly, the Court now makes and enters the following:
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AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that the parties intended to and did enter into a written contract

("Contract") wherein Plaintiff agreed to act as the general contractor and to oversee
construction of Defendants' residence in Park City, Utah.

The Contract called for a

construction period of one year.
2.

The Court finds that Defendant Stanley M. Kurzet drafted the written Contract.

3.

The Court finds that the Contract between the parties provided that Plaintiff

wrould complete construction on Defendants' residence within one year and, in return.
Defendants would pay Plaintiff $100,000 consideration for Plaintiffs general contractor
services in directing and supervising the construction, and $22.00 per hour for Plaintiffs own
hands on labor.
4.

The Court finds that the Defendants had experienced problems with prior

contractors on the residence and that Plaintiff was aware that Defendants had already
terminated two earlier general contractors for unsatisfactory performance. Plaintiff was also
aware that Stanley M. Kurzet was a meticulous antFdemanding individual and would require
exacting performance of the Contract.
5.

The Court finds that Plaintiff thereafter commenced performing its duties under

the Contract. Plaintiff performed some direct hands on labor to the project and was paid for
such work by Defendants. Plaintiff also performed services related to the services of a
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general contractor. Plaintiff has received no compensation for such general contractor
services.
6.

The Court finds that the parties also intended, and the Contract provided, for

Plaintiff to provide Defendants with evidence of adequate liability insurance covering its work
pursuant to the Contract. Such evidence of insurance was to have been provided by Plaintiff
within ten (10) days of execution of the Contract.
7.

The Court finds that Plaintiff represented to Defendants that Plaintiff had one

million dollars in liability insurance coverage in force at the time the parties entered into the
contract on July 3, 1990, that Defendants wanted such insurance increased to four or five
million in coverage, and that Plaintiff later discovered its policy was only for three hundred
thousand dollars and that it had been cancelled on October 24, 1989.
8.

The Court finds that, in a memorandum of July 20, 1990 from Defendants to

Plaintiff which was delivered to Michael Kent, Defendants notified Plaintiff that it had not yet
provided the necessary certificate evidencing insurance coverage and that Defendants required
such evidence under the terms of the Contract.
9.

The Court finds that Plaintiff did not subsequently provide the required

certificate of insurance to the Defendants.
10.

The Court finds that Plaintiff did not give the construction project the attention

that Plaintiff knew Mr. Kurzet would expect or demand.

4
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11.

The Court finds that some construction mistakes occurred during the course of

construction, causing Defendants subsequent damage for repairs, etc. in the total amount of
$4,359.00 and detailed as follows:
a.

the sum of $1,800 in connection with the construction of Defendants'

east side retaining wall;
b.

the sum of $2,000 in connection with the construction of Defendants'

west side concrete steps; and
c.

the sum of $559 in materials ordered for the job by Plaintiff but which

were subsequently deemed to be unnecessary.
12.

The Court finds that Defendants terminated Plaintiffs services on October 2,

1990. after three months of work on the construction project by Plaintiff;
13.

The Court finds that there is no provision in the Contract relating to the

measure of damages in the event of default thereof by either party.
14.

The Court finds that during the three month period that the Contract was in

effect, Michael Kent of the Plaintiff was on the construction site approximately thirty (30)
hours per week. In addition, Mr. Richard Allen of the Plaintiff visited the construction site,
practically every day for some period of time^ cu V\\s OO^N T ^ s ^ ^ r ^ r ^ .
15.

The Court finds that Mr. Allen was also available on his mobile phone when

not on site and made or received daily calls concerning the job.
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16.

The Court finds that Mr. Allen also spent considerable time at his home in the

evening making calls, setting up appointments and contacting other contractors in connection
with the job.
17.

The Court finds that during the three month period that the Contract was in

effect, Plaintiff performed general contractor services, including the hiring of subcontractors,
overseeing the work of subcontractors, getting bids on retaining walls, windows, cabinets and
other items, meeting with people, including building inspectors, and generally coordinating the
work on the job.
18.

The Court finds that during the time Plaintiff was the general contractor of the

project, the residence progressed from a concrete slab to a point where the roof was read) to
be completed on the multi-story residence. Based upon the testimony of Defendants' expert
witness, the Court finds that 10% of the construction project contemplated by the Contract
was completed during the time Plaintiff was general contractor.
19.

The Court finds that Defendant Stanley Kurzet was regularly on the job site,

often as much as six (6) hours a day. He persona^observed the progress on the home.

As

a result, Defendants were aware of the progress of the home while Plaintiff was the general
contractor and was aware of the benefit Defendants received as a result of Plaintiff s services.
20.

The Court finds that at no time during the three month period in which the

Contract was in effect did Defendants express any dissatisfaction with the work or progress on
the job. On at least one occasion Stanley Kurzet expressed to Plaintiff that he was satisfied
6
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with the way the work was going. Defendants did not attempt to stop Plaintiff from
completing the Contract until Defendant Stanley Kurzet terminated the same in connection the
insurance matter.
21.

The Court finds that Defendant Kurzet acknowledged at trial that Plaintiff was

the general contractor on the job during the time in which the work was completed which was
the subject of Plaintiff s Complaint.
22.

The Court finds that after commencing its duties under the Contract, Plaintiff

also inventoried and hand counted all lumber at the site which had been ordered by a prior
contractor. Plaintiff thereafter engaged in successful negotiations and settlement of a dispute
with the vendor of such lumber over the amount owing thereon.
23.

The Court finds that Defendants received a benefit of $5,500 through Plaintiffs

settlement of the dispute over the amount owed on the prior lumber order. Defendants were
aware of Plaintiffs involvement in such matter and were aware of the $5,500 savings which
they thereby received.
From the foregoing Amended Findings of-F3et, the Court now makes and enters the
following:
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes that the parties entered into a valid and binding Contract

on July 3, 1990 for the construction of Defendants' residence in Park City, Utah. Under the
terms thereof. Plaintiff was obligated to perform certain services and duties as general
7
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contractor of the construction and Defendants were similarly obligated to pay Plaintiff for
services rendered under the Contract.
2.

The Court concludes that given that amount of the Contract and the cost of the

construction, Plaintiff had a duty to inquire into the adequacy of its insurance coverage for the
project, but did not do so.
3.

The Court concludes that Defendants were justified in terminating Plaintiffs

services under the Contract as a result of Plaintiffs breach of its obligation to promptly
provide evidence of adequate liability insurance.
4.

The Court concludes that Defendants were not in breach of the Contract in any

way at the time Plaintiff was terminated as general contractor for the project.
5.

The Court finds that prior to Plaintiffs termination as general contractor, it had

not substantially completed their duties under the Contract. As a result, Plaintiff is not
entitled to recover under the Contract.
6.

The Court concludes that the parties intended under the Contract that Plaintiff

would be responsible for the actions of subcontracted on the job and responsible to
Defendants for any mistakes made by such subcontractors. Conversely, the Court concludes
that the parties also intended that Plaintiff should also be attributed with the benefits of any
cumulative work done by subcontractors on the project.
7.

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs services as general contractor conferred a

benefit to the Defendants.
8
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8.

The Court concludes that the Defendants were aware of the benefit conferred as

a result of Plaintiffs general contractor services through its actual on-site observation and
satisfaction of the work performed.
9.

The Court concludes that under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the

Defendants to retain the benefit received without payment for the same.
10.

The Court concludes that on the basis of contract implied in law, quasi-contract

or unjust enrichment, Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the Defendants the value of the
benefit conferred upon Defendants, less any damages resulting from Plaintiffs breach of the
Contract.
11.

The Court rejects Plaintiffs argument that it had earned and should receive

one-fourth, or $25,000, of the $100,000 fee because it had spent three months on the job, or
one quarter of the one year period for construction contemplated under the Contract. The
Court finds that such a position is unreasonable and unsupported by the facts.
12.

The Court concludes that the proper and appropriate measure of the benefit

conferred upon Defendants is the pro-rata portion-e£the fee previously agreed in the Contract.
Based upon the testimony of Defendants expert witness, one-tenth of construction
contemplated by the Contract was completed and as a result, Plaintiff conferred a benefit upon
Defendants in the amount of $10,000.
13.

The Court concludes that the Defendants suffered no damage as a result of

Plaintiffs failure to supply the required proof of insurance. As a result, no reduction to
9
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Plaintiffs recovery should be made in Defendants' favor for such element of the breach of
Contract.
14.

The Court concludes that Defendants did suffer damage resulting from

construction mistakes made while Plaintiff was the general contractor. The damage resulting
from such construction mistakes is the amount of $4,359, which amount should be deducted
from any amounts otherwise owing to the Plaintiff.
15.

On January 21, 1995, Judge Glenn Iwasaki of this Court entered Judgment in

favor of Defendants relating to attorneys fees incurred in the prior dismissal of the mechanic's
lien and bonding statute claims. The current balance of such Judgment is $2,170 and such
amount should also be deducted from any amounts otherwise owing to the Plaintiff. As a
result, such prior Judgment should be deemed satisfied.
16.

Except as set forth above, Defendants suffered no additional damage resulting

from Plaintiffs breach of the Contract and there are no other deductions applicable to
amounts otherwise owing to the Plaintiff.
17.

Negotiation of the disputed lumber-feftl left over from prior contractor was not

within the scope of the Contract.
18.

The Court concludes that with respect to the inventorying and negotiation of a

settlement on the disputed prior lumber bill, Plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the Defendants
in the amount of $5,500, which benefit is in addition to the benefit conferred by Plaintiffs'
completion of ten percent of the construction. The Court concludes that Defendants were
10
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aware of Plaintiffs actions with respect thereto and that it would be unjust to allow
Defendants to retain such benefit without payment of a reasonable fee to Plaintiff for such
benefit. Accordingly, the Court finds that a fee of one-half the savings on the lumber bill, or
$2,750, is fair and reasonable under the circumstances. The Court finds this result particularly
fair and reasonable inasmuch as the Court has deducted from Plaintiffs recovery the cost of
extra materials Plaintiff ordered for the job which were ultimately found to be unnecessary.
19.

Plaintiff should also be entitled to post-judgment interest as allowed by law

from and after the entry of Judgment. No pre-judgment interest is appropriate under Utah
law.
20.

Plaintiff should also be entitled to its costs of court incurred in prosecuting this

action in the amount of $542.40.
DATED this //_

day of

/^t*~~<-—

, 1996.

BY THE COURT:

/^2,
Horner^ Wilkinson
Third District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this XI

day of April, 1996, I caused to be hand delivered

a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following:
Spencer E. Austin, Esq.
William J. Evans, Esq.

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898

bjn^ajiev iTcl pie
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ADDENDUM NO. 3

Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers;
sanctions.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's address
also shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature
of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, jvhich may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)

